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A minority view is illustrated by the Illinois court. In Aiken v.
Insull 15 the federal court in following the Illinois law (although criti-
cizing it), held that an instrument which contained the following lan-
guage, "Nothing in this agreement and compromise ... shall be con-
strued to operate or to affect any cause of action, claims or demands
. .. against any person... other than any party to this settlement and
compromise. . .", was a release because it was couched in the terms
of a release although the obvious intent of the parties was otherwise. 16
Still another minority view is taken by the Tennessee court which holds
that any agreement which stipulates that it may be pleaded as a defense
to an action against the covenantee is a release of all joint tort-feasors
regardless of the form of the instrument.
17
Confusion and perhaps injustice could possibly be avoided if a court
when faced with such instruments would, instead of concerning itself
with the technical language of the agreement, base its decision on the
answers to the following questions: (1) What was the intent of the
parties as determined by the agreement and the surrounding circum-
stances? (2) To what extent has the injured party received full com-
pensation for the injury to him?' 8
Roy M. COLE.
Labor Law-Government Seizure-Liability for Operating Loss
Presidential Executive Order No. 9340' of May 1, 1943, directed
the Secretary of the Interior to take immediate possession, so far "as
necessary or desirable," of all coal mines in which a strike had occurred
1 122 F. 2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941).
1" The Illinois rule is otherwise in contract cases. Parmelee v. Lawrence, 44
I. 405 (1867)."7 Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S. W. 2d 171 (1933).
1" The practicing attorney should use great care in drafting an instrument which
is intended to be only a covenant not to sue in order to avoid a possible interpre-
tation by the court that it is an unqualified release of the claim for damages, and
to insure against the finding that it was executed in return for what the plaintiff
considered to be full compensation for the injury. The use of the word "release"
should be avoided lest it be given its technical connotation. Aiken v. Insull, 122
F. 2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941). And neither should all-inclusive language be employed.
Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont. 112, 112 P. 2d 1055 (1941). It should be stated
in the instrument that the amount paid was not intended as an accord and satisfac-
tion of the entire claim for damages (Aljian v. Ben Schlossberg, Inc., 8 N. J. Super.
461, 73 A. 2d 290 (1950)) and that it was the intention of the parties that the
agreement be merely a covenant not to sue and not a release. Chicago & A. R.
Co. v. Averill, 224 Ill. 516, 79 N. E. 654 (1906). The agreement should contain a
reservation of a right of action against the remaining tort-feasor (Aljian v. Ben
Schlossberg, Inc., supra; Garbe v. Halloran, 150 Ohio St. 476, 83 N. E. 2d 217
(1948)) and this reservation should be included in the same instrument. Natrona
Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo, 284, 225 Pac. 586 (1924) (release discharges all
liability instantaneously) ; but see, Wright v. Fischer, 24 Tenn. App. 650, 148 S. W.
2d 49 (1940) (allowed supplementary agreement to vary original agreement).
S1I CODE FED. Rr~s. p. 1276 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
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or was threatened. Among the mines seized on that date were those
of the Pewee Coal Company, a Tennessee corporation, which subse-
quently sought to recover for a $36,128.96 operating loss sustained during
the period of Government possession. The Court of Claims awarded
$2,241.26, a sum representing that part of the loss found to have been
occasioned by the effectuation of a War Labor Board order granting
a fringe-wage increase to Pewee's employees.
2
In affirming, the Supreme Court (though splitting on the question
of compensation) unanimously agreed that there was a taking of the
respondent's property, pointing out that in United States v. United Mine
Workers of America3 they treated the seizure as making the mines
Government facilities "in as complete a sense as if the Government held
full title and ownership."4  It might be noted, however, that the Mine
Workers opinion concerned itself with the status of the employees, and
specifically refrained from expressing any conclusion as to the respective
powers and obligations of the Government and the operators during the
control period. 5 It is suggested, too, that the Executive Order did not
in itself constitute a taking since it was but a declaration of what could
be done if "necessary or desirable," 6 and that the measure of operational
control actually exercised by the Secretary was within the powers of
governmental regulation. 7 But the Government found itself in the some-
what awkward position of having to contend for no taking in a situation
where, to all outward appearances at least, a taking had been precisely
the objective sought to be attained ;s and this apparent anomaly, more
than theory or precedent, was probably the undoing of that contention.9
As to the compensability of such a taking, Justice Black10 argued,
2Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (one dissent).
330 U. S. 258 (1947).
'United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 671 (1951).
5330 U. S. 258, 288 (1947).
'And the "mere enactment of legislation which authorizes condemnation of
property cannot be a taking." Danforth v. United States, 308 U. S. 271, 286
(1939).
' Federal price controls do not involve a taking, Bowles, Price Adm'r v.
Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 517 (1944) ; nor war-time allocation of materials, St.
Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 831 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U. S. 815 (1948) ; nor wage and hour controls, United States v. Darby, 312 U. S.
100 (1941) ; nor even forced cessation of mining operations, as a war measure,
Oro Fina Consol. Mines, Inc. v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
cert. denied, 71 Sup. Ct. 1015 (1951).
' Besides the requirement of compliance with the WLB order, Government di-
rectives ordered the flying of the American flag, posting of the property, compliance
with OPA and safety regulations, continuance of the six-day week (evidently vol-
untary on Pewee's part), and certain reports to the Government. Respondent's
president was assigned to serve as "Operating Manager for the United States."
""If the Government was dishonest, if its priotestations were lacking in integrity,
what is there left in which we can place our trust?" Pewee Coal Co. v. United
States. 88 F. Supp. 426. 429 (Ct. Cl. 1950). See also United States v. Pewee
Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 671 (1951).
10 With whom concurred Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson.
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in the opinion of the Court, that the Government was responsible for
all losses suffered by Pewee during the seizure.11 Justice Reed con-
curred, but only to the extent of the award below, contending that the
Government should be responsible for only those losses occasioned by
its intervention. 12 The dissenting justices would have allowed no re-
covery, since they saw no proof of financial injury to the company.
18
The dissenting opinion 14 represents a view which would leave upon
the plaintiff the burden of demonstrating that losses were suffered during
the seizure in excess of any which would have been sustained but for
that seizure. Such a view finds a measure of support in many cases.15
Justice Reed used language of similar import, but felt that the company
had successfully carried its burden by proving that there was a Govern-
ment act which (as he saw it) increased operating expenses unneces-
sarily. Both of these views purport to follow the general principle of
Marion & Rye Valley Ry. v. United States,16 the difference between
them running to questions of proof.17 The opinion of the Court, on the
other hand, apparently represents a departure from the theory of that
case, inasmuch as it is said to be enough that there were operating losses
and that the plaintiff sued for them-the crucial fact being that the
Government chose to intrude. In fashioning its argument the opinion
cited no precedent, but explained:
"When a private business is possessed and operated for public
use, no reason appears to justify imposition of losses sustained on
the person from whom the property was seized. This is concep-
tually distinct from the Government's obligation to pay fair corn-
"United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).1 Id. at 674 (concurring opinion).
" Id. at 674 (dissenting opinion).
"Together with the dissent below, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
426, 431 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
15 E.g., United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338
U. S. 396, 406 (1949) ; United States v. John J. Felin & Co., 334 U. S. 624, 641
(1948); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 273 (1943);
Westchester County Park Comm'n v. United States, 143 F. 2d 688, 692 (2nd Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 726 (1944).
""Nothing was recoverable as just compensation, because nothing of value was
taken from the company; and it was not subjected by the Government to pecuniary
loss." 270 U. S. 280, 282 (1926).
"'Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
vacated on jurisdictioial grounds, 71 Sup. Ct. 730 (1951), involved the seizure of
motor carriers who had refused to comply with a WLB order. The suit was for
just compensation, and the Court of Claims award, as in the companion Pewee
case, was in the amount of increased wages. There the court admitted that it was
no% sure that the increase really occasioned a net loss to the company, since losses
might have been heavier absent seizure, but satisfied itself that the value of such
"speculation" was outweighed by the actual fact of an increased operational cost
ordered by the Government. This spells out one difference between Justice Reed
and the dissenters in the principal case. They also apparently disagreed as to the
necessity of proving the non-enforceability of WLB orders. As to the latter point
see NAToNAL WAR LARoR BOARD TERmiNATioN REPORT 415-424 (1946).
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pensation for property taken, although in cases raising the issue,
the Government's profit and loss experience may well be one
factor involved in computing reasonable compensation for a tem-
porary taking."18
Such a distinction, however, could create more problems than it solves,
because of its "heads I win and tails you lose" aspect,lO because it might
render seizures impractical in some cases, and because it could inspire
money-losing companies to solicit seizure.2 0 Furthermore, it would seem
more realistic to say that a company which has been seized as a national
defense measure should recover only resultant losses, rather than profit
from the transaction, at public expense, to the extent of recovering all
its other losses.
2 1
In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States22 it was held that the
proper measure of compensation for the temporary taking of a laundry
was the rental which probably could have been obtained plus an award
for damage to machinery and equipment in excess of ordinary wear and
tear. United States v. General Motors Corp.23 held, similarly, that the
condemnee was entitled to compensation for fixtures and permanent
equipment destroyed or 'depreciated in value by the taking, in addition
to the value of the occupancy. Accordingly, granted there was a taking,
it may be argued that an award to Pewee equivalent to the amount of
all losses could be justified as representing property destroyed during
the period of Government seizure.2 4 This contention, though not men-
tioned as such in the opinion, resembles that of Justice Black to the
effect that the "proprietor" should reap any profits and bear any losses.2 5
And it is submitted that the answer to both these propositions lies in
this distinction: in each of the two cited cases the Government appro-
priated and used the properties for its own purposes, that being the
very object of the seizure; while in the Pewee case the company was
allowed (with one exception) to operate as it saw fit, the object there
S United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).
" The condemnee (as here) would not have to bear losses but yet "might"
receive, in the calculation of conceptually distinct "fair compensation," the benefit
of a consideration of any profits made. This consideration, moreover, could be
the dominant one. Prince Line, Ltd. v. United States, 283 F. 535 (E. D. N. Y.
1922), writ of error dimissed, 263 U. S. 727 (1923).
"0 See Willcox and Landis, Goverginent Seizures in Labor Disputes, 34 CORNELL
L. Q. 155, 170-172 (1948).
21 Just compensation "must, of course, be just to the public as well as to the
owner." C. G. Blake Co. v. United States, 275 F. 861, 867 (S. D. Ohio 1921),
aff'd, 279 F. 71 (6th Cir. 1922). See also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 574
(1897). It is submitted that this solicitude for the public welfare should obtain
regardless of conceptual distinctions.
"338 U. S. 1 (1949).
23 323 U. S. 373 (1945).
"Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 181-182, Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp.
426 (Ct. Cl. 1950)."United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 672 (1951).
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being merely the continuation of operations. On the one hand an
offending, on the other an unoffending,26 sovereign. As Justice Reed
said: "The most reasonable solution is to award compensation to the
owner as determined by a court under all the circumstances of the
particular case."2 7'
Anderson v. Chesapeake Ferry Co. 28 is an interesting case to com-
pare with Pewee. It was a three-to-two decision to the effect that where
the Virginia Highway Commissioner seized temporarily the properties
of a strike-bound ferry, the fair rental value to which the company was
entitled was to be determined with reference to the value of the proper-
ties at the time of taking and their earning capacity under the circum-
stances at that time. Under this decision the State kept the profits,
since they represented, according to the majority, money made by virtue
of the "power of the State to quicken into action an idle enterprise"
which would have remained "idle and without any capacity to earn for
its owner except for the exercise of the State's authority."2 9 This is
cleariy speculation, paralleling the views of the dissents in both Pewee
cases, since no one can really know that the strikers would not have
been forced into submission had there been no seizure. However, the
opposing view, which is akin to the majority opinions in both cases, is
open to a similar accusation in that it insists upon treating the ferry
company as a "going concern" 3 0-thus disregarding the strike situation.
Which of the two ideas is preferable would seem to be a matter all too
susceptible of argument either way, but it may be mentioned, in passing,
that it would probably be hard to conceive of a union less likely to yield
to company pressure than the United Mine Workers.
Also of interest in the comparison of the Pewee and Anderson cases
is the role which labor-management considerations played, or may have
played, in the respective results. There is no doubt that such considera-
tions influenced the Virginia decision, since the majority opinion ob-
serves that if the company could take all the profits without assuming
operational risks "its willingness to take back its properties might not
arrive on winged feet."31  This decision may be said to award labor a
bargaining advantage, even though the right to strike was suspended,
inasmuch as wages were continued but company revenues practically
obliterated. Conversely, the dissent, in awarding profits as the correct
"Pewee's major losses apparently resulted from a combination of bad luck and
bad mining procedure. Pewee Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 426, 430
(Ct. Cl. 1950).
2"United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 673 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
2 186, Va. 481, 43 S. E. 2d 10 (1947).
29 Id. at 489, 43 S. E. 2d at 15.
30Id. at 511, 43 S. E. 2d at 26." Id. at 499, 43 S. E. 2d at 20.
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measure of compensation, would have given the upper hand to manage-
ment, the authority of the State then becoming a hobble upon the bar-
gaining strength of labor. 32 In the Pewee case (involving, of course,
losses instead of profits) there was no discussion of bargaining powers,
but Justice Black would have given the advantage to management:
clearly, a company which is losing money as Pewee was33will have no
incentive to settle its -differences with the union so long as all its losses
are borne by someone else; more than that, such a decision would be a
strong incentive toward continuation of Government control, and might
even induce some companies to seek such control. The concurring
opinion (and the holding) does not offer asylum to the financially sick,
but it, too, does seem to favor management, since the company, upon
settlement, would accomplish nothing more than the assumption of
whatever increase was finally agreed upon. In either of these two situa-
tions, whether or not the employees were satisfied with their temporary
agreement would matter little or nothing to management, economically
speaking; but if they were satisfied then they also would have at least
no particular reason to strive for de-control, thus compounding the odds
against good-faith bargaining. Under the dissent's view, however, the
company would have had to pay everything, including the increase in
wages, and, consequently, the question of advantage to one side or the
other would seem to depend solely upon how satisfied each was with
the temporary settlement. It is submitted that this view is preferable
to either of the other two in respect of labor-management relations,
inasmuch as Government's place in that respect should be "in the middle"
-favoring, as nearly as possible, neither side.3 4
L. K. FuRGuRsoN, JR.
Liens-Subcontractors-Acquisition and Priorities
In 1874, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held, in Wilkie v.
Bray,1 that there was no right to a lien under the statute2 providing for
mechanic's, laborer's, or materialman's liens unless there was a contract
" For a discussion of this problem (which, however, apparently leaves open the
question of what is fair rental value under such circumstances) see Gerhart, Strikes
and Eminent Domain, 30 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 116 (1946).
"Net loss for the period of seizure (May 1 to October 12, 1943) was $36,128.96.
""The greatest danger in the establishment of government seizure policy is
that the normal processes of collective bargaining will be disrupted. Crisis meas-
ures should be reserved for crisis problems, voluntary mediation for normal col-
lective bargaining. This implies two requirements: first, that voluntary mediation
machinery of the government should be perfected before emphasis is placed on
supplementary procedures; second, that seizure should not be permittd to be used
as an instrument of economic pressure by either management or labor." Teller,
Government Seizure in Labor Disputes, 60 HARv. L. REV. 1017, 1054 (1947).
71 N. C. 205 (1874).
N. C. Laws 1868-69, c. 206, §1, now, N. C. GEN. STAT. §44-1 (1950).
1951]
